This paragraph contains a historical analysis of the main innovative tactical ideas, and will be used to investigate whether these ideas have had an effect on team performance.
Results
The pyramid
The first theoretical debate in the history of football goes back to the second half of the nineteenth century, with the comparison between the English 1–1–8 formation (one defender, one midfielder and eight forwards) and the Scottish 2–2–6 formation (two defenders, two midfielders and six forwards) (Fig. 1).
In the first case, the game plan relies on a single player being faster than his adversary (dribbling game), while the second case involves the players passing the ball to each other (passing game).
The first real incremental innovation was the transition from the 2–2–6 formation to the 2–3–5 “pyramid” formation (Fig. 2), successfully applied by the Blackburn Rovers, who were then able to win five consecutive FA Cups in the late nineteenth century. In the 2–3–5 formation, playing field space is distributed more evenly among the players in a team, and for the first time, each player has a defined position.
“Metodo” and “WM system”
The second great innovation in terms of technical–tactics in football came about following a change to the rules of the game, caused by a dramatic drop in the goals scored in the English Championship during the early part of the twentieth century.
The cause of this slump was explained by the introduction of the offside rule, whereby a striker was only in the correct place if there were three players from the opposite team in front of him when he received the ball. In practice, a defender only had to move forward for the striker to be automatically offside and the game to be stopped.
To stop offside obstruction tactics, the rules were altered and, for the striker still to be in play, the opposite side players in front of the striker were brought down from three to two.
The change meant that an attacking game was more successful and the Arsenal manager, Herbert Chapman, tried out a new technical–tactical theory, which came to be known as the “WM system” (Fig. 3), with a three-man defense, a four-square midfield and an attack with two lateral players and one at the center, visually forming the letters WM.
With this formation, Herbert Chapman won the FA Cup in 1930 and the English Championship in 1931 and 1933.
While the change to the offside rule led to the creation of the WM system in England, in continental Europe, Vittorio Pozzi, coach of the Italian national team, devised an alternative formation that came to be known as the “Metodo” (the method), used by Italy to win the Central European International Cup in 1930 and 1935, back-to-back World Cups in 1934 and 1938 and the Olympics in 1936 (Fig. 4). The Metodo consisted a two-person defense, one with the task of marking the opposite side’s center forward and the other without marking duties (right and left fullbacks); the midfield was made up of three players, two with the task of marking the opposite side’s wings (halfbacks) and one being a free agent (center halfback); the attack was composed of five players, two being slightly back (right inside forward and left inside forward) and three forward (right winger, left winger and center forward).
We should stress that both methods emerged in substantially closed environments, since England started taking part in tournaments organized in mainland Europe only after the Second World, and at this point the WM system started taking over from the Metodo in all competitions.
Brazil and Italy
The first major change to the WM system was introduced by Béla Guttmann, who won the São Paulo State Championship with São Paulo in 1957 and the European Champion Clubs’ Cup (European Cup) twice in a row with Benfica (1960/1961 and 1961/1962). It also inspired the formation created by Vicente Italo Feola, with which Brazil won the World Cup in Sweden in 1958. In this 4–2–4 formation, the defense was strengthened by the inclusion of a player taken from the midfield and included a hefty four-man attack (Fig. 5).
In reality, this formation also exploited the newly improved athleticism of players, especially as the intention was to use midfielders as additional defenders during a defensive phase and as attackers during an offensive phase.
While the 4–2–4 formation was the first important evolution of the WM system, another development, the “Catenaccio” (=“deadlock”, a close defense system also known as the “Chain”), in its various interpretations, was the winning formation throughout the 1960s (Fig. 6). Compared to the traditional WM system, Karl Rappan from Switzerland, universally accredited for inventing the precursor of the catenaccio formation, had the idea of removing a midfielder and placing him along the defender line; subsequently, the Italian Giuseppe Viani placed the additional defender behind the defending line, freeing him from any fixed marking duties.
Using this formation and adapting it with the skills of their players, Nereo Rocco of Italy (Fig. 7a) at AC Milan won two Italian Championships (1961/1962 and 1967/1968), two European Cups (1962/1963 and 1968/1969) and one Intercontinental Cup (1969), and Helenio Herrera of Spain (Fig. 7b) at Inter won three Italian Championships (1962/1963, 1964/1965 and 1965/1966), two European Cups (1963/1964 and 1964/1965) and two Intercontinental Cups (1964 and 1965).
All the evidence points to this being a formation that is particularly careful in how its defense is organized and, for many years, formed the basis of the Italian School, with many Italian football clubs being able to assert themselves abroad. One particular variation was used by the Italian national football team, which won the World Cup in Spain in 1982.
The revolution of “total football”
Towards the end of the 1960s, a new “Total Football” model emerged as a reaction to the catenaccio formation. This was introduced by Marinus “Rinus” Michels, legendary manager of Ajax and the national Dutch team.
He modernized football, making the following technical–tactical changes.
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(a)
The purpose of a formation is not to fill the space between players on the football pitch, but to create new space through movement.
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(b)
Within a team, there must only be two specific positions apart from the goalkeeper: the central defender and the striker. Everyone else has to be rapid, adaptable and quickly able to switch positions.
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(c)
In defense, the team lined up in “zones” with no man-to-man marking. This meant that each player has an allocated zone of the pitch to control rather than another player to trail and tackle.
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(d)
The typical method to regain control of the ball is “pressing”, which in substance means attacking the adversary in possession of the ball with at least three men.
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(e)
Plays starts with a 4–4–2 formation (Fig. 8), where the defense and the midfield take up parallel lines, which makes it both easy to switch positions and also to engage in offside tactics, involving a sudden collective move forwards from the backline, with the purpose of placing one or more players of the opposite team in an offside position.
Using this formation, Ajax was able to win three European Cups one after another (1970/1971, 1971/1972 and 1972/1973), Holland reached the World Cup final twice (1974 and 1978) and won the UEFA European Football Championship in 1988.
In addition, using a less dynamic version of the 4–4–2 formation developed by Michels, the English clubs Liverpool, Aston Villa and Nottingham Forest were able to win a total of seven European Cups in the 10 years between 1976 and 1986.
Another version of Rinus Michels’s “Total Football” made its mark at the end of the 1980s, when Arrigo Sacchi took over at AC Milan, winning with the team, among other things, one Italian Championship 1997/1998), two European Cups (1988/1989 and 1989/1990) and two Intercontinental Cups (1989 and 1990).
The theory behind Sacchi’s formation is the basic concept of the game, which substantially is a system of strategies and tactics that the coach/manager demands from the team. This idea, which must be accepted and shared by both club and team leads to a series of consequences at organizational and technical–tactical level.
At an organizational level, according to Sacchi’s philosophy, the players to buy must be individuals with great human and professional qualities, who can understand the importance of placing their talent at the service of the group; in other words, they must be true stars (Marshall 1920; Rosen 1981; Simonton 1999; Anderson and Sally 2014).
At a technical–tactical level, the idea can be expressed differently according to the actual phase of the game. If the opposite team has the ball, the method to regain possession rapidly is to use zone defense alongside offside tactics and pressing. Once back in possession, the main offensive methods are fast restarts and circulating the ball rapidly often using fast vertical passes.
Sacchi had no preferred formation, although at AC Milan he often used the variation of a 4–4–2 formation which includes a diamond-shaped midfield (Fig. 9).
Mourinho and Guardiola
In the mid 1990s, the introduction of three points awarded for winning a game marked the transition to more daring tactical formations, with a greater number of players taking part in the offensive action.
Many coachers/managers have been able to adjust to the three point rule, introducing incremental changes in the formation. Among these, the most significant are, in Italy, Marcello Lippi (three Italian Championships, one Champions League Cup (the previous European Cup) and one Intercontinental Cup with Juventus FC and a World Cup with the Italian national team) (Fig. 10a) and Carlo Ancelotti (one Italian Championship, two Champions League Cups and one Intercontinental Cup with AC Milan) (Fig. 10b).
In recent years, observers in the sector have carefully noted the work methodology of Josè Mourinho of Portugal, with whom Inter Milan was able to win the Italian Championship, the Italian Cup and the Champions League Cup during the single season 2009/2010.
Mourinho’s innovation consists mainly in his training methods, defined as “tactical periodization”. According to this approach, a coach/manager initially tries to instill in his players a set of potential intentions, that is, mental images of a specific type of game. Then, with each workout, he will try and bring into effect intentions that can suitably match the potential intentions, acting to reduce any discrepancy between the two.
Practically, this means that there is no distinction between physical, technical and mental training, since a player, once on the pitch, must use all his physical, technical and mental skills simultaneously and in an integrated fashion.
The approach known as the “Mourinho method” is often compared to the style of game applied by Joseph “Pep” Guardiola at Barcelona. During the season 2006–2007, at the helm of the club for only 3 years, Barcelona won 12 titles out of a possible 15. The main methods introduced by the Catalan coach/manager can be distinguished into three distinct areas: technical–tactical, athletic and psychological. At a technical–tactical level, the game of Pep Guardiola recalls the total football of Rinus Michels, with an innovative twist on higher ball possession and pressing, that is taken to the limit of the adversary’s area. The defensive and offensive lines are functional. The former involves remaining close to the midfield, the latter is formed by a wide, agile three-man attack that is always connected to the other lines, and involves continuous raid incursions into the penalty area (“cutting”) while waiting for the ball from the midfielders. From an athletic prospective, Barcelona players are known for their running style, with short little quick steps, which, on the one side, gives them better control over the ball and its interception and, on the other, saves a lot of energy. Long and prolonged surges are avoided since the Barcelona players are normally very close together in the field, and this prevents the onset of anaerobic metabolism and, therefore, going past the threshold beyond which an athlete begins to accumulate lactic acid and starts tiring. No less important than the technical–tactical and athletic aspects is the player’s psychological training, based upon the objective of reducing unforeseen situations and containing emotion in the various phases of the game, by acting on “working memory”, that is, on the player’s operational unconscious.
Discussion
This brief examination of the history of ideas in the world of football consists in highlighting some particularly interesting aspects concerning the complex relationship between technical–tactical innovation and a team’s wins.
First of all, it emerges that while not every win is based upon the assumption of innovation, the teams that have generated long-term winning cycles have often been able to combine their players’ talent with innovative technical–tactical formations, managing to defend, for a certain period of time, their competitive advantage.
In the absence of legal methods to protect an innovative idea, it is useful to question the tools that have led to this defense, formulating concepts about the sustainability of competitive advantage in football teams.
Under a technical profile, some answers can be found in the context of the scientific model known as the resource-based view of a company (Barney 1986, 1991; Grant 1991; Peteraf 1993; Penrose 1959) according to which, the capacity of companies to gain a stable and sustainable competitive advantage is closely linked to their opportunities of exploiting their own distinctive skills.
According to the resource-based view, two properties determine whether competitive advantage is sustainable, the imperfect mobility of strategic resources and the presence of ex-post limits to competition.
With reference to the first property, Dierickx and Cool (1989) state that, in an organization, firm-specific resources (Becker 1964; Hashimoto 1981; Lazear 2003) are imperfectly mobile because they would lose part of their value if used in a different context from that in which they were created and accumulated.
In the football setting, this happens, for example, when players are only at ease when playing in a certain game formation.
Concerning the second property, Lippman and Rumelt (1982) coined the term “isolating mechanisms” to define the processes or variables that can be used to limit or hinder imitation on the part of competing companies. The tactical component of knowledge (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995), an important category mentioned previously, can be considered as an integral part of the concept of isolating mechanisms.
Many of the changes introduced in football team formations are the result of a process of adapting to changes in the external environment, resulting from a variety of causes, among which, in particular, increased competition and the introduction of new game rules. There are, it is true, cases similar to technological discontinuity (Tushman and Anderson 1986), such as the introduction of Total Football, which led to substantial changes in the football environment, bringing on a period of great vibrancy that induced many teams to try and exploit the opportunities deriving from new trajectories.
Winter (1987) observed that the more complex a skill is the lesser the risk of it being imitated. It follows that, by developing knowledge that is highly complex, there is a good chance that it will not be imitated, ensuring lasting competitive advantage for at least three types of reason. The first is linked to the difficulty of replicating operational procedures. The second to the difficulty in understanding which procedures are effectively capable of improving performance. The third is linked to the high complementarity with other elements in the system, so that there is no certainty that new procedures, once replicated, can provide the same level of performance in a different environment.
In light of the above, it is clear that not every technical–tactical innovation introduced by coaches/managers can be defended against attempts made by the competition to imitate them. Only innovation involving a complex set of competencies that are tightly integrated with other elements in the organization can lead to long-term competitive advantage.
